to this the fines inflicted constantly, on the slightest pretext, on
private individuals, we shall certainly remain below the mark in stating
that Germany succeeds in getting out of Belgium over twenty million
pounds a year. Twenty million pounds, when the ordinary income of the
State amounts scarcely to seven millions! And I am not taking into
account the money seized in the banks and the recent enforced transfer
to Germany of the 600 millions (£24,000,000) of the National Bank.

If we remember that the total value of commercial transactions in
Belgium, before the war, did not exceed ten million francs (400,000
pounds) per year, we shall realise the absurdity of the German argument
which shifts on to the English blockade the responsibility for Belgium's
ruin. Even a complete stoppage of trade could not have done the country
as much harm as the German exactions in money only. But the conquerors
were not satisfied with fleecing the flock, they succeeded in robbing it
of its food, in taking away its very means of life.

* * * * *

Quite apart from any sentimental or moral reason, the last step was a
grave mistake, even from the German point of view. It would certainly
have paid the Germans better in the end if they had allowed the Allies
to send raw material to feed the Belgian factories, under the control of
neutral powers, and if they had not requisitioned the machines and
paralysed industry by the most absurd restrictions. It would have been a
most useful move from the point of view of propaganda, and, while posing
as Belgium's kind protectors, they might always have reaped the benefit
through fresh taxes and new contributions. If they have killed the goose
rather than gather its golden eggs it is because they could not afford
to wait. It was one of these desperate measures, like the violation of