The Riddle of the Rhine; chemical strategy in peace and war by Victor LeFebure
page 4 of 281 (01%)
page 4 of 281 (01%)
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We are faced with the following alternatives. Safety demands strong
organic chemical industries or cumbersome and burdensome chemical warfare establishments. The stability of future peace depends upon the former, and the extent to which we must establish, or can abandon, the latter depends entirely on the activity and success of those whose special duty it is to organise against war. A recent visit to America revealed the considerable publicity and public interest surrounding chemical warfare, strengthening my conviction that the facts, now noised abroad, should be presented in their proper setting. They are supremely significant at the present time and for the future, hence the chapters which follow. V. LEFEBURE. HAMPSTEAD, _October_ 12, 1920. PREFACE BY FIELD MARSHAL FOCH In 1918, chemical warfare had developed considerably in our army. Before 1914 Germany possessed chemical factories which permitted her to manufacture in great quantities chemicals used at the front, and to develop on a large scale this new form of fighting. The Allies, to retaliate, had to experiment and organise important centres for production. Only in this way, though starting late, were they able to put themselves in a position to supply the growing necessities of their armies. |
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