But here arose a puzzle in the mind of Philo, as it in reality had, we
may see, in the minds of Socrates and Plato. How could he reconcile the
idea of that absolute and eternal one Being, that Zeus, Father of Gods
and men, self-perfect, self-contained, without change or motion, in
whom, as a Jew, he believed even more firmly than the Platonists, with
the Daemon of Socrates, the Divine Teacher whom both Plato and Solomon
confessed? Or how, again, could he reconcile the idea of Him with the
creative and providential energy, working in space and time, working on
matter, and apparently affected and limited, if not baffled, by the
imperfection of the minds which he taught, by the imperfection of the
matter which he moulded? This, as all students of philosophy must know,
was one of the great puzzles of old Greek philosophy, as long as it was
earnest and cared to have any puzzles at all: it has been, since the
days of Spinoza, the great puzzle of all earnest modern philosophers.
Philo offered a solution in that idea of a Logos, or Word of God,
Divinity articulate, speaking and acting in time and space, and
therefore by successive acts; and so doing, in time and space, the will
of the timeless and spaceless Father, the Abysmal and Eternal Being, of
whom he was the perfect likeness. In calling this person the Logos, and
making him the source of all human reason, and knowledge of eternal
laws, he only translated from Hebrew into Greek the name which he found
in his sacred books, "The Word of God." As yet we have found no unfair
allegorising of Moses, or twisting of Plato. How then has he incurred
this accusation?

I cannot think, again, that he was unfair in supposing that he might
hold at the same time the Jewish belief concerning Creation, and the
Platonic doctrine of the real existence of Archetypal ideas, both of
moral and of physical phenomena. I do not mean that such a conception
was present consciously to the mind of the old Jews, as it was most