military affairs, took place before officials called _alcades_, who
acknowledged no higher authority than the Governor himself, and enforced
the laws as autocrats. The new military Governors took over the old
system bodily and appointed new _alcaldes_ where it seemed necessary.
The new _alcaldes_ neither knew nor cared anything about the old Mexican
law and its provisions. This disregard cannot be wondered at, for even a
cursory examination of the legal forms convinces one that they were
meant more for the enormous leisure of the old times than for the
necessities of the new. In the place of Mexican law each _alcalde_
attempted to substitute his own sense of justice and what recollection
of common-law principles he might be able to summon. These common-law
principles were not technical in the modern sense of the word, nor were
there any printed or written statutes containing them. In this case they
were simply what could be recalled by non-technical men of the way in
which business had been conducted and disputes had been arranged back in
their old homes. But their main reliance was on their individual sense
of justice. As Hittell points out, even well-read lawyers who happened
to be made _alcaldes_ soon came to pay little attention to
technicalities and to seek the merit of cases without regard to rules or
forms. All the administration of the law was in the hands of these
_alcaldes_. Mason, who once made the experiment of appointing a special
court at Sutter's Fort to try a man known as Growling Smith for the
murder of Indians, afterwards declared that he would not do it again
except in the most extraordinary emergency, as the precedent was bad.

As may well be imagined, this uniquely individualistic view of the law
made interesting legal history. Many of the incumbents were of the rough
diamond type. Stories innumerable are related of them. They had little
regard for the external dignity of the court, but they strongly insisted
on its discipline. Many of them sat with their feet on the desk, chewing