larger source of revenue poured in its wealth to him later on, in
rapidly increasing volume, from North and South America.

Charles had inherited a long and bitter feud with France about the
Burgundian dominions on the French side of the Rhine and about domains
in Italy; besides which there were many points of violent rivalry
between things French and Spanish. England also had hereditary feuds
with France, which had come down from the Hundred Years' War, and which
had ended in her almost final expulsion from France less than a century
before. Scotland, nursing old feuds against England and always afraid of
absorption, naturally sided with France. Portugal, small and open to
Spanish invasion by land, was more or less bound to please Spain.

During the many campaigns between Francis and Charles the English
Channel swarmed with men-of-war, privateers, and downright pirates.
Sometimes England took a hand officially against France. But, even when
England was not officially at war, many Englishmen were privateers and
not a few were pirates. Never was there a better training school of
fighting seamanship than in and around the Narrow Seas. It was a
continual struggle for an existence in which only the fittest survived.
Quickness was essential. Consequently vessels that could not increase
their speed were soon cleared off the sea.

Spain suffered a good deal by this continuous raiding. So did the
Netherlands. But such was the power of Charles that, although his navies
were much weaker than his armies, he yet was able to fight by sea on two
enormous fronts, first, in the Mediterranean against the Turks and other
Moslems, secondly, in the Channel and along the coast, all the way from
Antwerp to Cadiz. Nor did the left arm of his power stop there; for his
fleets, his transports, and his merchantmen ranged the coasts of both