virtuous works, or of dignities that have been worthily acquired.

And in truth, returning to the main argument, I say, as before, that
it is permitted to a man for requisite reasons to speak of himself.
And amongst the several requisite reasons two are most evident: the
one is when a man cannot avoid great danger and infamy, unless he
discourse of himself; and then it is conceded for the reason, that to
take the less objectionable of the only two paths, is to take as it
were a good one. And this necessity moved Boethius to speak of
himself, in order that under pretext of Consolation he might excuse
the perpetual shame of his imprisonment, by showing that imprisonment
to be unjust; since no other man arose to justify him. And this reason
moved St. Augustine to speak of himself in his Confessions; that, by
the progress of his life, which was from bad to good, and from good to
better, and from better to best, he might give example and
instruction, which, from truer testimony, no one could receive.
Therefore, if either of these reasons excuse me, the bread of my
moulding is sufficiently cleared from its first impurity.

The fear of shame moves me; and I am moved by the desire to give
instruction which others truly are unable to give. I fear shame for
having followed passion so ardently, as he may conceive who reads the
afore-named Songs, and sees how greatly I was ruled by it; which shame
ceases entirely by the present speech of myself, which proves that not
passion but virtue may have been the moving cause.

I intend also to demonstrate the true meaning of those Poems, which
some could not perceive unless I relate it, because it is concealed
under the veil of Allegory; and this it not only will give pleasure to
hear, but subtle instruction, both as to the diction and as to the