may think an impertinent question? I never can go on with an
address unless I feel, or know, that my audience are either with me
or against me: I do not much care which, in beginning; but I must
know where they are; and I would fain find out, at this instant,
whether you think I am putting the motives of popular action too
low. I am resolved, to-night, to state them low enough to be
admitted as probable; for whenever, in my writings on Political
Economy, I assume that a little honesty, or generosity,--or what
used to be called "virtue,"--may be calculated upon as a human
motive of action, people always answer me, saying, "You must not
calculate on that: that is not in human nature: you must not
assume anything to be common to men but acquisitiveness and
jealousy; no other feeling ever has influence on them, except
accidentally, and in matters out of the way of business." I begin,
accordingly, tonight low in the scale of motives; but I must know if
you think me right in doing so. Therefore, let me ask those who
admit the love of praise to be usually the strongest motive in men's
minds in seeking advancement, and the honest desire of doing any
kind of duty to be an entirely secondary one, to hold up their
hands. (About a dozen hands held up--the audience, partly, not
being sure the lecturer is serious, and, partly, shy of expressing
opinion.) I am quite serious--I really do want to know what you
think; however, I can judge by putting the reverse question. Will
those who think that duty is generally the first, and love of praise
the second, motive, hold up their hands? (One hand reported to have
been held up behind the lecturer.) Very good: I see you are with
me, and that you think I have not begun too near the ground. Now,
without teasing you by putting farther question, I venture to assume
that you will admit duty as at least a secondary or tertiary motive.
You think that the desire of doing something useful, or obtaining