of them held the opinion that the money should be accepted because
it would reduce the funds of the Spanish Government and also because
the money had been wrung from Filipinos. The Commissioners, I added,
left after assuring me that the people in Manila would rise against
the Spaniards if supplied with arms, and that the best thing I could
do was to make an attack on Manila at the places they pointed out as
being the weakest parts of the Spanish defense and consequently the
easiest to overcome.

I thanked the Commission for their loyalty and straightforwardness,
told them they would be given an escort to take them safely back to
the Spanish lines, and that when they got back they should inform
those who had sent them that they were not received because they were
not duly accredited and that even if they had brought credentials
according to what they had seen and heard from the Revolutionists
Don Emilio Aguinaldo would certainly not consider, much less accept,
their proposals respecting autonomy because the Filipino people had
sufficient experience to govern themselves, that they are tired of
being victimised and subjected to gross abuses by a foreign nation
under whose domination they have no wish to continue to live, but
rather wish for their _independence_. Therefore the Spaniards might
prepare to defend their sovereignty, for the Filipino Army would
vigorously assault the city and with unflagging zeal prosecute the
siege until Manila was captured.

I also told the Commissioners to tell Archbishop Nozaleda that he was
abusing the privileges and authority of his exalted position; that
such conduct was at variance with the precepts of His Holiness the
Pope, and if he failed to rectify matters I would throw light on the
subject in a way which would bring shame and disgrace upon him. I added