and it was, moreover, diametrically opposed to the high ends of the
Revolutionary Government, that after going to the trouble of besieging
Manila for two months and a half, sacrificing thousands of lives and
millions of material interests, it should be supposed such sacrifices
were made with any other object in view than the capture of Manila
and the Spanish garrison which stubbornly defended the city.

But General Merritt, persistent in his designs, begged me not only
through the Admiral but also through Major Bell to withdraw my
troops from the suburbs to (as it was argued) prevent the danger
of conflict which is always to be looked for in the event of dual
military occupation; also by so doing to avoid bringing ridicule upon
the American forces; offering, at the same time, in three letters,
to negotiate after his wishes were complied with. To this I agreed,
though neither immediately nor at one time, but making our troops
retire gradually up to the blockhouses in order that the whole of the
inhabitants of Manila should witness the proceedings of our troops
and amicability toward our American allies.

Up to that time, and in fact right up to the time when the Americans
openly commenced hostilities against us, I entertained in my soul
strong hopes that the American Commanders would make absolute with
their Government the verbal agreement made and entered into with the
Leader of the Philippine Revolution, notwithstanding the indications
to the contrary which were noticeable in their conduct, especially
in respect of the conduct of Admiral Dewey, who, without any reason
or justification, one day in the month of October seized all our
steamers and launches.

Being informed of this strange proceeding, and at the time when the