distrust of capitalistic institutions. The message acquired
importance, too, from the President's extraordinary claim to the right
of judging both the constitutionality and the expediency of proposed
legislation, independently of Congress and the Courts.

The veto plunged the Senate into days of acrid debate. Clay pronounced
Jackson's construction of the veto power "irreconcilable with the
genius of representative government." Webster declared that
responsibility for the ruin of the Bank and for the disasters that
might follow would have to be borne by the President alone. Benton and
other prominent members, however, painted Jackson as the savior of his
country; and the second vote of 22 to 19 yielded a narrower majority
for the bill than the first had done. Thus the measure perished.

The bank men received the veto with equanimity. They professed to
believe that the balderdash in which the message abounded would make
converts for their side; they even printed thirty thousand copies of
the document for circulation. Events, however, did not sustain their
optimism. In the ensuing campaign the Bank became, by its own choice,
the leading issue. The National Republicans, whose nominee was Clay,
defended the institution and attacked the veto; the Jacksonians
reiterated on the stump every charge and argument that their leader
had taught them. The verdict was decisive. Jackson received 219 and
Clay 49 electoral votes.

The President was unquestionably right in interpreting his triumph as
an endorsement of the veto, and he naturally felt that the question
was settled. The officers and friends of the Bank still hoped,
however, to snatch victory from defeat. They had no expectation of
converting Jackson or of carrying a charter measure at an early date.