advise and consent to or to reject the nominations so made, whilst
the House of Representatives stands as the public censor of the
performance of official duties, with the prerogative of investigation
and prosecution in all cases of dereliction. The blemishes and
imperfections in the civil service may, as I think, be traced in most
cases to a practical confusion of the duties assigned to the several
Departments of the Government. My purpose in this respect has been
to return to the system established by the fundamental law, and to
do this with the heartiest cooperation and most cordial understanding
with the Senate and House of Representatives.

The practical difficulties in the selection of numerous officers for
posts of widely varying responsibilities and duties are acknowledged
to be very great. No system can be expected to secure absolute freedom
from mistakes, and the beginning of any attempted change of custom
is quite likely to be more embarrassed in this respect than any
subsequent period. It is here that the Constitution seems to me to
prove its claim to the great wisdom accorded to it. It gives to
the Executive the assistance of the knowledge and experience of the
Senate, which, when acting upon nominations as to which they may be
disinterested and impartial judges, secures as strong a guaranty of
freedom from errors of importance as is perhaps possible in human
affairs.

In addition to this, I recognize the public advantage of making all
nominations, as nearly as possible, impersonal, in the sense of being
free from mere caprice or favor in the selection; and in those offices
in which special training is of greatly increased value I believe such
a rule as to the tenure of office should obtain as may induce men of
proper qualifications to apply themselves industriously to the task of