discordant elements, only temporarily brought together by the hope of
breaking up the government. In the next place it felt that it could
not be justified by sound constitutional usage in asking a parliament
in which the people were now imperfectly represented, to settle
definitely such important questions as the clergy reserves and the
seigniorial tenure. Lord Elgin had himself no doubt of the necessity
for obtaining a clear verdict from the people by means of "the more
perfect system of representation" provided by law. In the debate on
the Representation Bill in 1853, John A. Macdonald did not hesitate to
state emphatically that the House should be governed by English
precedents in the position in which it would soon be placed by the
passage of this measure. "Look," he said, "at the Reform Bill in
England. That was passed by a parliament that had been elected only
one year before, and the moment it was passed, Lord John Russell
affirmed that the House could not continue after it had declared that
the country was not properly represented. How can we legislate on the
clergy reserves until another House is elected, if this bill passes? A
great question like this cannot be left to be decided by a mere
accidental majority. We can legislate upon no great question after we
have ourselves declared that we do not represent the country. Do these
gentlemen opposite mean to say that they will legislate on a question
affecting the rights of people yet unborn, with the fag-end of a
parliament dishonoured by its own confessions of incapacity?" Hincks
in his "Reminiscences," printed more than three decades later than
this ministerial crisis, still adhered to the opinion that the
government was fully justified by established precedent in appealing
to the country before disposing summarily of the important questions
then agitating the people. Both Lord Elgin and Sir John A.
Macdonald--to give the latter the title he afterwards received from
the Crown--assuredly set forth the correct constitutional practice