sensory appearances, and the law which determines this flux, and
according to which the appearances come, is the law of causation.
But we are nowhere so neglectful of causation as in the deeds of
mankind. A knowledge of that region only psychology can give us.
Hence, to become conversant with psychological principles, is the
obvious duty of that conscientiousness which must hold first place
among the forces that conserve the state. It is a fact that there
has been in this matter much delinquency and much neglect. If,
then, we were compelled to endure some bitterness on account of it,
let it be remembered that it was always directed upon the fact that
we insisted on studying our statutes and their commentaries, fearfully
excluding every other discipline that might have assisted us,
and have imported vitality into our profession. It was Gneist[1]
who complained: ``The contemporary low stage of legal education
is to be explained like much else by that historical continuity which
plays the foremost rle in the administration of justice.'' Menger[2]
does not mention ``historical continuity'' so plainly, but he points
sternly enough to the legal sciences as the most backward of all
disciplines that were in contact with contemporary tendencies.
That these accusations are justified we must admit, when we consider
what Stlzel[3] and the genial creator of modern civil teaching
demands: ``It must be recognized that jurisprudence in reality
is nothing but the thesis of the healthy human understanding in
matters of law.'' But what the ``healthy human mind'' requires
we can no longer discover from our statutory paragraphs only.
How shameful it is for us, when Goldschmidt[4] openly narrates how a
famous scientist exclaimed to a student in his laboratory: ``What
do you want here? You know nothing, you understand nothing,
you do nothing,--you had better become a lawyer.''