the explanation of texts. To jurisprudence was left only the empty
shell, and a man like Ihering[1] spoke of a ``circus for dialectico-
acrobatic tricks.''

Yet the scientific quality is right to hand. We need only to take
hold of the method, that for nearly a century has shown itself to
us the most helpful. Since Warnknig (1819)[2] told us, ``Jurisprudence
must become a natural science,'' men have rung changes upon
this battle cry (cf. Spitzer[3]). And even if, because misunderstood,
it led in some directions wrongly, it does seem as if a genuinely
scientific direction might be given to our doctrines and their application.
We know very well that we may not hurry. Wherever people
delayed in establishing the right thing and then suddenly tried for
it, they went in their haste too far. This is apparent not only in
the situations of life; it is visible, in the very recent hasty conclusions
of the Lombrosists, in their very good, but inadequate observations,
and unjustified and strained inferences. We are not to figure the
scientific method from these.[4] It is for us to gather facts and to
study them. The drawing of inferences we may leave to our more
fortunate successors. But in the daily routine we may vary this
procedure a little. We draw there _*particular_ inferences from correct
and simple observations. ``From facts to ideas,'' says ttingen.[5]
``The world has for several millenniums tried to subdue matter to
preconceptions and the world has failed. Now the procedure is
reversed.'' ``From facts to ideas''--there lies our road, let us
for once observe the facts of life without prejudice, without maxims
built on preconceptions; let us establish them, strip them of all
alien character. Then finally, when we find nothing more in the
least doubtful, we may theorize about them, and draw inferences,
modestly and with caution.