make. The first of these is recognition of their debts, the
interest on which, "in view of Russia's difficult financial
position and her unsatisfactory credit," they propose to
guarantee in raw materials. Then, "in view of the interest
continually expressed by foreign capital in the question of
the exploitation for its advantage of the natural resources of
Russia, the Soviet Government is ready to give to subjects of
the powers of the Entente mineral, timber and other
concessions, to be defined in detail, on condition that the
economic and social structure of Soviet Russia shall not be
touched by the internal arrangements of these concessions."
The last point is that which roused most opposition. It
expresses a willingness to negotiate even concerning such
annexations, hidden or open, as the Allies may have in
mind. The words used are "The Russian Soviet
Government has not the intention of excluding at all costs
consideration of the question of annexations, etc. . . ." Then,
"by annexations must be understood the retention on this or
that part of the territory of what was the Russian Empire,
not including Poland and Finland, of armed forces of the
Entente or of such forces as are maintained by the
governments of the Entente or enjoy their financial, military,
technical or other support." There follows a statement that
the extent of the concessions will depend on the military
position. Chicherin proceeds to give a rather optimistic
account of the external and internal situation. Finally he
touches on the question of propaganda. "The Russian
Soviet Government, while pointing out that it cannot limit
the freedom of the revolutionary press, declares its
readiness, in case of necessity to include in the general