1st. I am entitled to the guardianship of my nephew, not only by his
father's will, but by law, and this the Court of Justice confirmed to the
exclusion of the mother. When business called me away from Vienna, I
conceded that Herr Nussböck should act for me _ad interim_. Having now,
however, taken up my residence here, the welfare of my nephew demands that
I should again undertake the office of his guardian.

2d. My nephew has arrived at an age when he requires to be trained to a
higher degree of cultivation. Neither his mother nor his present guardian
are calculated to guide the boy in the pursuit of his studies. The former,
in the first place, because she is a woman; and as to her conduct, it has
been legally proved that, to say the least of it, she has no creditable
testimonials to bring forward,[1] on which account she was expressly
prohibited from acting by the Court of Justice. How the Honorable
Magistracy could nevertheless again appoint her is quite incomprehensible.
The latter is unfit; because, on the one hand, his office as sequestrator
and administrator of houses and lands, occupies his time too much to enable
him properly to undertake the duties of guardian to the boy; and, on the
other, because his previous occupation as a paper manufacturer, does not
inspire me with any confidence that he possesses the intelligence or
judgment indispensable to conduct a scientific education.

3d. The welfare of my nephew is dearer to my heart than it can be to any
one else. I am myself childless, and have no relations except this boy, who
is full of talent, and I have good grounds to hope the best for him, if
properly trained. Now I am compelled to hear that he has been delayed a
whole year by remaining in his previous class, from want of means to defray
the expense, and that his mother intends to remove him from his present
school, and wishes him to live with her. What a misfortune to the boy, were
he to become a victim to the mismanagement of his mother, who would fain