preserve them from all error prejudicial thereunto: which Things have
so good evidence, that none who are not manifestly prejudic'd, can
refuse assent thereto, when they are duly represented to them: but
without having weigh'd this evidence, the Divine Authority of the
Scriptures may, possibly, be by some firmly believ'd, but cannot be so
upon the conviction of their Reason.

The Instruction then of most Peoples Younger Years being such as we
have seen in regard of Religion: and _Vertue_, viz. The right
regulation of our Passions, and Appetites, having (as has been
abovesaid) no other sufficient inforcement than the Truths of
Religion; can it reasonably be thought strange, that there is so
little Vertue in the World as we find there is? or that
correspondently to their Principles, Peoples Actions generally are (at
best) unaccountable to their Reason? For Time, and more Years, if they
give strength to our Judgments whereby we may be thought able to
inform our selves, and correct the errors and defects of our
Education, give also strength to our Passions; which grown strong, do
furnish and suggest Principles suited to the purposes and ends that
they propose; besides, that Ill Habits once settl'd, are hardly
chang'd by the force of any principles of which Reason may come to
convince Men at their riper Age: A Truth very little weigh'd; tho'
nothing ought more to be so with respect to a vertuous Education;
since rational Religion, so soon as they are capable thereof, is not
more necessary to the ingaging People to Vertue, than is the fixing,
and establishing in them good Habits betimes, even before they are
capable of knowing any other reason for what they are taught to do,
than that it is the Will of Those who have a just power over them that
they should do so. For as without a Knowledge of the Truths of
Religion, we should want very often sufficient Motives, and