reason, plainly make known the Superiority of its Nature; and that its
suggestions, ought to be hearken'd to by us preferably to those of
Sense; where these (as it too often happens) do not concur. For did we
know nothing by _Inference_ and _Deduction_, both our knowledge and
injoyment would be very short of what they now are; many considerable
pleasures depending almost intirely upon Reason; and there being none
of the greatest Enjoyments of Sense which would not lose their best
Relish, separated from those concomitant satisfactions which
accompany them only as we are rational Creatures. Neither is it our
greatest happiness alone which is manifestly provided for in our being
indu'd with this Faculty; but our much greater safety, and
preservation likewise; since _these_ require a capacity in us of
foreseeing distant Events, and directing means to an End, oftentimes
through a long train of Actions; which is what we can only do by that
in us, whereby the Relations, Dependencies and Consequences of things
are discoverable to us.

But as _Reason_ is that which either in kind or degree, differences
Men from Brutes; and that there are few, if any, who would lose this
distinction, it is by common consent acknowledg'd that Reason is in
respect of all others, a preferable indowment. And if Beasts, only
inferiour to Men in the advantages of this Faculty, appear hereby
intended to be subjected to Men, it cannot be less evident That that
part in Men which they have in common with Beasts, was likewise
design'd by their Maker to be subjected to their Reason also. From All
which, it undeniably follows that we do not act answerably to the
Will, or pleasure of God, in making us such Creatures as we are, if we
either neglect the Search of those Measures of our Actions prescrib'd
to us by the discernable Natures of Things; or, if seeing these, we
yet conform not our selves thereunto.