Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Cristian life by Lady Damaris Cudworth Masham
page 40 of 109 (36%)
page 40 of 109 (36%)
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Good: experience it self, we see, contradicting such a consequence:
and that so evidently that I think we do not in fact find that even Those, who the most indulge to their Passions and Appetites, do so as believing upon a cool examination thereof, that to do thus is the truest Wisdom, in consequence of our greatest Good consisting in pleasure; but such Men indulge to their present Appetites meerly as being strongly induc'd (contrary oftentimes to the suggestions of their own minds therein) thro' the love of pleasure, and abhorrence of pain, to do, or forbear whatever they find will procure to them the one, or free them from the other at the present Time; the Gratification whereof They prefer to that which is Future. It is however true that such declamations as are sometimes made against pleasure absolutely (not the irregular pursuit of it) as if pleasure was in its own Nature, a false, and deceitful, not a real and solid Good, have produc'd this ill effect, that many from the absurdity hereof are confirm'd in an evil indulgence of their Appetites, as if to Gratifie These was indeed the truest Wisdom of a rational Creature, in consequence of pleasure, being his chief Good. But they judge not thus from a due examination, or any examination at all of the nature of Things, but from a Reason (if it may be call'd so) of opposition. For so ridiculously weak are a great part of Men in their Reasoning, that seeing they are in the wrong who oppose them, they become from thence as much perswaded, and as well satisfy'd that the contrary to such Mens Assertions is true; or that themselves are in the right, as if they saw that these things really were so. This arguing yet is no more irrational than that whereby a palpable Truth is deny'd, only because some have indeavour'd to draw, or have been thought to have drawn ill consequences from it: Which is yet all the ground of not allowing that Pleasure, and Pain, are truly Good, and Evil; the denying of which, can be of no Service to Morality, but the contrary, |
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