For hundreds of years it was the ambition of Japan to replace China as the
Protector of Korea. It was the more mortifying, therefore, that the
Hanabusa incident served to strengthen China's authority. It gave Peking an
excuse to despatch and maintain a considerable force at Seoul, for the
first time for hundreds of years.

The Japanese tried to turn the affair to their advantage by demanding-still
more concessions. The Korean rulers found it hard to refuse these
determined little men. So they adopted a policy of procrastination, arguing
endlessly. Now Japan was in a hurry, and could not wait.

The Japanese Minister at Seoul at this time was Takezoi, timid and
hesitating constitutionally, but, like many timid folk, acting at times
with great rashness. Under him was a subordinate of stronger and rougher
type, Shumamura, Secretary to the Legation. Shumamura kept in touch with a
group of Cabinet Ministers who had been to Japan and regarded Japan as
their model. They mourned together over the growth of Chinese power, and
agreed that it was threatening the independence of the country. They
repeated the rumour that a secret treaty had actually been signed by the
King, recognizing Chinese supremacy in more binding form than ever before.
They felt that the Queen was against them. Her nephew, Min Yung-ik, had
been on their side when he returned from America. Now, under her influence,
he had taken the other side.

Kim Ok-kiun, leader of the malcontents, was an ambitious and restless
politician, eager to have the control of money. One of his chief supporters
was Pak Yung-hyo, relative of the King, twenty-three years old, and a
sincere reformer. Hong Yung-sik, keen on foreign ways, was a third. He was