have "studiously avoided committing myself to a belief in a universal
Father, or a moral Governor, or even in a Personal God," it seems clear
to me that the _Supernatural Religion_ about which Dr. Lightfoot has
been writing cannot be my work, but is simply a work of his own
imagination. That work cannot possibly have contained, for instance,
the chapter on "Anthropomorphic Divinity," [36:2] in which, on the
contrary, I studiously commit myself to very decided disbelief in such
a "Personal God" as he means. In no way inconsistent with that chapter
are my concluding remarks, contrasting with the spasmodic Jewish
Divinity a Supreme Being manifested in the operation of invariable
laws--whose very invariability is the guarantee of beneficence and
security. If Dr. Lightfoot, however, succeeded in convicting me of
inconsistency in those final expressions, there could be no doubt which
view must logically be abandoned, and it would be a new sensation to
secure the approval of a divine by the unhesitating destruction of the
last page of my work.

Dr. Lightfoot, again, refers to Mr. Mill's "Three Essays on Religion,"
but he does not appear to have very deeply studied that work. I confess
that I do not entirely agree with some views therein expressed, and I
hope that, hereafter, I may have an opportunity of explaining what they
are; but I am surprised that Dr. Lightfoot has failed to observe how
singularly that great Thinker supports the general results of
_Supernatural Religion_, to the point even of a frequent agreement
almost in words. If Dr. Lightfoot had studied Mill a little more
closely, he would not have committed the serious error of arguing:
"Obviously, if the author has established his conclusions in the first
part, the second and third are altogether superfluous. It is somewhat
strange, therefore, that more than three-fourths of the whole work
should be devoted to this needless task." [37:1] Now my argument in the