conclusions, have nevertheless temperately argued against them, for the
courtesy with which they have treated an opponent whose views must
necessarily have offended them, and I can only say that, whilst such a
course has commanded my unfeigned respect, it has certainly not
diminished the attention with which I have followed their arguments.

There are two serious misapprehensions of the purpose and line of
argument of this work which I desire to correct. Some critics have
objected that, if I had succeeded in establishing the proposition
advanced in the first part, the second and third parts need not have
been written: in fact, that the historical argument against miracles is
only necessary in consequence of the failure of the philosophical. Now
I contend that the historical is the necessary complement of the
philosophical argument, and that both are equally requisite to
completeness in dealing with the subject. The preliminary affirmation
is not that miracles are impossible, but that they are antecedently
incredible. The counter-allegation is that, although miracles may be
antecedently incredible, they nevertheless actually took place. It is,
therefore, necessary, not only to establish the antecedent
incredibility, but to examine the validity of the allegation that
certain miracles occurred, and this involves the historical enquiry
into the evidence for the Gospels which occupies the second and third
parts. Indeed, many will not acknowledge the case to be complete until
other witnesses are questioned in a succeeding volume. ...

The second point to which I desire to refer is a statement which has
frequently been made that, in the second and third parts, I endeavour to
prove that the four canonical Gospels were not written until the end of
the second century. This error is of course closely connected with that
which has just been discussed, but it is difficult to understand how