of things, can, by their convergent action, direct consciousness to the
precise point where there is a certain intuition to be seized. By choosing
images as unlike as possible, we prevent any one of them from usurping the
place of the intuition it is intended to call up, since it would in that
case be immediately routed by its rivals. In making them all, despite
their different aspects, demand of our mind the same kind of attention, and
in some way the same degree of tension, we accustom our consciousness
little by little to a quite peculiar and well-determined disposition,
precisely the one which it ought to adopt to appear to itself unmasked."
("Introduction to Metaphysics".)

Strictly speaking, the intuition of immediacy is inexpressible. But it can
be suggested and called up. How? By ringing it round with concurrent
metaphors. Our aim is to modify the habits of imagination in ourselves
which are opposed to a simple and direct view, to break through the
mechanical imagery in which we have allowed ourselves to be caught; and it
is by awakening other imagery and other habits that we can succeed in so
doing.

But then, you will say, where is the difference between philosophy and art,
between metaphysical and aesthetic intuition? Art also tends to reveal
nature to us, to suggest to us a direct vision of it, to lift the veil of
illusion which hides us from ourselves; and aesthetic intuition is, in its
own way, perception of immediacy. We revive the feeling of reality
obliterated by habit, we summon the deep and penetrating soul of things:
the object is the same in both cases; and the means are also the same;
images and metaphors. Is Mr Bergson only a poet, and does his work amount
to nothing but the introduction of impressionism in metaphysics?

It is an old objection. If the truth be told, Mr Bergson's immense