on any particular subject, either in a country such as England, where
the law is unwritten, or in continental countries, where the most
exhaustive and complete codes have been framed. Nevertheless, in spite
of the occurrence of such difficulties, it would be foolish to contend
that the laws in force for the time being have not a greater influence
on the practice of mercantile transactions than the convenience of
merchants has upon the law. How much more potent must this influence
have been when the law did not apply simply to outward observances,
but to the inmost recesses of the consciences of believing Christians!

The opinion that mediæval teaching exercised a profound effect on
mediæval practice is supported by authorities of the weight of Ashley,
Ingram, and Cunningham,[1] the last of whom was in some respects
unsympathetic to the teaching the influence of which he rates so
highly. 'It has indeed,' writes Sir William Ashley, 'not infrequently
been hinted that all the elaborate argumentation of canonists and
theologians was "a cobweb of the brain," with no vital relation to
real life. Certain German writers have, for instance, maintained that,
alongside of the canonist doctrine with regard to trade, there existed
in mediæval Europe a commercial law, recognised in the secular courts,
and altogether opposed to the peculiar doctrines of the canonists.
It is true that parts of mercantile jurisprudence, such as the law of
partnership, had to a large extent originated in the social conditions
of the time, and would have probably made their appearance even
if there had been no canon law or theology. But though there were
branches of commercial law which were, in the main, independent of
the canonist doctrine, there were none that were opposed to it. On
the fundamental points of usury and just price, commercial law in the
later Middle Ages adopted completely the principles of the canonists.
How entirely these principles were recognised in the practice of the