policy, that an unlimited expansion of naval force should not be
permitted to any nation which cannot be approached by land,--a
description which can apply only to Great Britain.
----

This steady keeping to a general line of policy was doubtless made
specially easy for successive English governments by the clear
indications of the country's conditions. Singleness of purpose was to
some extent imposed. The firm maintenance of her sea power, the
haughty determination to make it felt, the wise state of preparation
in which its military element was kept, were yet more due to that
feature of her political institutions which practically gave the
government, during the period in question, into the hands of a class,
--landed aristocracy. Such a class, whatever its defects otherwise,
readily takes up and carries on a sound political tradition, is
naturally proud of its country's glory, and comparatively insensible
to the sufferings of the community by which that glory is maintained.
It readily lays on the pecuniary burden necessary for preparation and
for endurance of war. Being as a body rich, it feels those burdens
less. Not being commercial, the sources of its own wealth are not so
immediately endangered, and it does not share that political timidity
which characterizes those whose property is exposed and business
threatened,--the proverbial timidity of capital. Yet in England this
class was not insensible to anything that touched her trade for good
or ill. Both houses of Parliament vied in careful watchfulness over
its extension and protection, and to the frequency of their inquiries
a naval historian attributes the increased efficiency of the executive
power in its management of the navy. Such a class also naturally
imbibes and keeps up a spirit of military honor, which is of the first
importance in ages when military institutions have not yet provided