1. Whatever may be thought of Clerk's claim to originality in
constructing a system of naval tactics, and it has been seriously
impugned, there can be no doubt that his criticisms on the past were
sound. So far as the author knows, he in this respect deserves credit
for an originality remarkable in one who had the training neither of a
seaman nor of a military man.
----

It has already been pointed out that the American War of Independence
involved a departure from England's traditional and true policy, by
committing her to a distant land war, while powerful enemies were
waiting for an opportunity to attack her at sea. Like France in the
then recent German wars, like Napoleon later in the Spanish war,
England, through undue self-confidence, was about to turn a friend
into an enemy, and so expose the real basis of her power to a rude
proof. The French government, on the other hand, avoided the snare
into which it had so often fallen. Turning her back on the European
continent, having the probability of neutrality there, and the
certainty of alliance with Spain by her side, France advanced to the
contest with a fine navy and a brilliant, though perhaps relatively
inexperienced, body of officers. On the other side of the Atlantic she
had the support of a friendly people, and of her own or allied ports,
both in the West Indies and on the continent. The wisdom of this
policy, the happy influence of this action of the government upon her
sea power, is evident; but the details of the war do not belong to
this part of the subject. To Americans, the chief interest of that war
is found upon the land; but to naval officers upon the sea, for it was
essentially a sea war. The intelligent and systematic efforts of
twenty years bore their due fruit; for though the warfare afloat ended
with a great disaster, the combined efforts of the French and Spanish