kingdom; the successful ending, with its delusive promise of rest and
peace, but sounded the knell of the Dutch Republic. So long as the
power of Spain remained unimpaired, or at least great enough to keep
up the terror that she had long inspired, it was to the interest of
England and of France, both sufferers from Spanish menace and
intrigue, that the United Provinces should be strong and independent.
When Spain fell,--and repeated humiliations showed that her weakness
was real and not seeming,--other motives took the place of fear.
England coveted Holland's trade and sea dominion; France desired the
Spanish Netherlands. The United Provinces had reason to oppose the
latter as well as the former.

Under the combined assaults of the two rival nations, the intrinsic
weakness of the United Provinces was soon to be felt and seen. Open to
attack by the land, few in numbers, and with a government ill adapted
to put forth the united strength of a people, above all unfitted to
keep up adequate preparation for war, the decline of the republic and
the nation was to be more striking and rapid than the rise. As yet,
however, in 1660, no indications of the coming fall were remarked. The
republic was still in the front rank of the great powers of Europe.
If, in 1654, the war with England had shown a state of unreadiness
wonderful in a navy that had so long humbled the pride of Spain on the
seas, on the other hand the Provinces, in 1657, had effectually put a
stop to the insults of France directed against her commerce and a year
later, "by their interference in the Baltic between Denmark and
Sweden, they had hindered Sweden from establishing in the North a
preponderance disastrous to them. They forced her to leave open the
entrance to the Baltic, of which they remained masters, no other navy
being able to dispute its control with them. The superiority of their
fleet, the valor of their troops, the skill and firmness of their