It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the
teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened.
They are there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also
as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of the conditions.
This is less obviously true as to tactics, when the fleets come into
collision at the point to which strategic considerations have brought
them. The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the
weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of
fighting,--in the handling and disposition of troops or ships on the
battlefield. Hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected
with maritime matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from
the study of former experiences; that time so used is wasted. This
view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad
strategic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat,
which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will
continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-sided and
narrow even as to tactics. The battles of the past succeeded or failed
according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of
war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or
failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these
principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them
to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day. He will
observe also that changes of tactics have not only taken place after
changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the
interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless
arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the
energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome
the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be
remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study
of the powers and limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a