At Trafalgar it was not Villeneuve that failed, but Napoleon that was
vanquished; not Nelson that won, but England that was saved; and why?
Because Napoleon's combinations failed, and Nelson's intuitions and
activity kept the English fleet ever on the track of the enemy, and
brought it up in time at the decisive moment. (1) The tactics at
Trafalgar, while open to criticism in detail, were in their main
features conformable to the principles of war, and their audacity was
justified as well by the urgency of the case as by the results; but
the great lessons of efficiency in preparation, of activity and energy
in execution, and of thought and insight on the part of the English
leader during the previous months, are strategic lessons, and as such
they still remain good.

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1. See note at end of Introductory Chapter.
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In these two cases events were worked out to their natural and
decisive end. A third may be cited, in which, as no such definite end
was reached, an opinion as to what should have been done may be open
to dispute. In the war of the American Revolution, France and Spain
became allies against England in 1779. The united fleets thrice
appeared in the English Channel, once to the number of sixty-six sail
of the line, driving the English fleet to seek refuge in its ports
because far inferior in numbers. Now, the great aim of Spain was to
recover Gibraltar and Jamaica; and to the former end immense efforts
both by land and sea were put forth by the allies against that nearly
impregnable fortress. They were fruitless. The question suggested--
and it is purely one of naval strategy--is this: Would not Gibraltar
have been more surely recovered by controlling the English Channel,