Macedonia, and Spain. With the first two, communication could be had
only by sea. From Spain, where his firmest support was found, he could
be reached by both land and sea, unless an enemy barred the passage;
but the sea route was the shorter and easier.

In the first years of the war, Rome, by her sea power, controlled
absolutely the basin between Italy, Sicily, and Spain, known as the
Tyrrhenian and Sardinian Seas. The sea-coast from the Ebro to the
Tiber was mostly friendly to her. In the fourth year, after the battle
of Cannae, Syracuse forsook the Roman alliance, the revolt spread
through Sicily, and Macedonia also entered into an offensive league
with Hannibal. These changes extended the necessary operations of the
Roman fleet, and taxed its strength. What disposition was made of it,
and how did it thereafter influence the struggle?

The indications are clear that Rome at no time ceased to control the
Tyrrhenian Sea, for her squadrons passed unmolested from Italy to
Spain. On the Spanish coast also she had full sway till the younger
Scipio saw fit to lay up the fleet. In the Adriatic, a squadron and
naval station were established at Brindisi to check Macedonia, which
performed their task so well that not a soldier of the phalanxes ever
set foot in Italy. "The want of a war fleet," says Mommsen, "paralyzed
Philip in all his movements." Here the effect of Sea Power is not even
a matter of inference. In Sicily, the struggle centred about Syracuse.
The fleets of Carthage and Rome met there, but the superiority
evidently lay with the latter; for though the Carthaginians at times
succeeded in throwing supplies into the city, they avoided meeting the
Roman fleet in battle. With Lilybaeum, Palermo, and Messina in its
hands, the latter was well based on the north coast of the island.
Access by the south was left open to the Carthaginians, and they were