despite unavoidable delays arising from false information and
uncertainty as to the enemy's movements. The same untiring ardor
enabled him to bring up his own ships from Cadiz to Brest in time to
make the fleet there superior to Villeneuve's, had the latter
persisted in his attempt to reach the neighborhood. The English, very
inferior in aggregate number of vessels to the allied fleets, were by
this seasonable reinforcement of eight veteran ships put into the best
possible position strategically, as will be pointed out in dealing
with similar conditions in the war of the American Revolution. Their
forces were united in one great fleet in the Bay of Biscay, interposed
between the two divisions of the enemy in Brest and Ferrol, superior
in number to either singly, and with a strong probability of being
able to deal with one before the other could come up. This was due to
able action all round on the part of the English authorities; but
above all other factors in the result stands Nelson's single-minded
pursuit of "his fleet."

This interesting series of strategic movements ended on the 14th of
August, when Villeneuve, in despair of reaching Brest, headed for
Cadiz, where he anchored on the 20th. As soon as Napoleon heard of
this, after an outburst of rage against the admiral, he at once
dictated the series of movements which resulted in Ulm and Austerlitz,
abandoning his purposes against England. The battle of Trafalgar,
fought October 21, was therefore separated by a space of two months
from the extensive movements of which it was nevertheless the outcome.
Isolated from them in point of time, it was none the less the seal of
Nelson's genius, affixed later to the record he had made in the near
past. With equal truth it is said that England was saved at Trafalgar,
though the Emperor had then given up his intended invasion; the
destruction there emphasized and sealed the strategic triumph which