Spain, through her maritime weakness, but offered so many points for
insult and injury.

The geographical position of a country may not only favor the
concentration of its forces, but give the further strategic advantage
of a central position and a good base for hostile operations against
its probable enemies. This again is the case with England; on the one
hand she faces Holland and the northern powers, on the other France
and the Atlantic. When threatened with a coalition between France and
the naval powers of the North Sea and the Baltic, as she at times was,
her fleets in the Downs and in the Channel, and even that off Brest,
occupied interior positions, and thus were readily able to interpose
their united force against either one of the enemies which should seek
to pass through the Channel to effect a junction with its ally. On
either side, also, Nature gave her better ports and a safer coast to
approach. Formerly this was a very serious element in the passage
through the Channel but of late, steam and the improvement of her
harbors have lessened the disadvantage under which France once
labored. In the days of sailing-ships, the English fleet operated
against Brest making its base at Torbay and Plymouth. The plan was
simply this: in easterly or moderate weather the blockading fleet kept
its position without difficulty but in westerly gales, when too
severe, they bore up for English ports, knowing that the French fleet
could not get out till the wind shifted, which equally served to bring
them back to their station.

The advantage of geographical nearness to an enemy, or to the object
of attack, is nowhere more apparent than in that form of warfare which
has lately received the name of commerce-destroying, which the French
call _guerre de course_. This operation of war, being directed