with the rest of the world by it. If a country be imagined having a
long seaboard, but entirely without a harbor, such a country can have
no sea trade of its own, no shipping, no navy. This was practically
the case with Belgium when it was a Spanish and an Austrian province.
The Dutch, in 1648, as a condition of peace after a successful war,
exacted that the Scheldt should be closed to sea commerce. This closed
the harbor of Antwerp and transferred the sea trade of Belgium to
Holland. The Spanish Netherlands ceased to be a sea power.

Numerous and deep harbors are a source of strength and wealth, and
doubly so if they are the outlets of navigable streams, which
facilitate the concentration in them of a country's internal trade;
but by their very accessibility they become a source of weakness in
war, if not properly defended. The Dutch in 1667 found little
difficulty in' ascending the Thames and burning a large fraction of
the English navy within sight of London; whereas a few years later the
combined fleets of England and France, when attempting a landing in
holland, were foiled by the difficulties of the coast as much as by
the valor of the Dutch fleet. In 1778 the harbor of New York, and with
it undisputed control of the Hudson River, would have been lost to the
English, who were caught at disadvantage, but for the hesitancy of the
French admiral. With that control, New England would have been
restored to close and safe communication with New York, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania; and this blow, following so closely on Burgoyne's
disaster of the year before, would probably have led the English to
make an earlier peace. The Mississippi is a mighty source of wealth
and strength to the United States; but the feeble defenses of its
mouth and the number of its subsidiary streams penetrating the country
made it a weakness and source of disaster to the Southern Confederacy.
And lastly, in 1814, the occupation of the Chesapeake and the