and a navy commensurate to its other resources as a sea power, the
great extent of its sea-coast and its numerous inlets would have been
elements of great strength. The people of the United States and the
Government of that day justly prided themselves on the effectiveness
of the blockade of the whole Southern coast. It was a great feat, a
very great feat; but it would have been an impossible feat had the
Southerners been more numerous, and a nation of seamen. What was there
shown was not, as has been said, how such a blockade can be
maintained, but that such a blockade is possible in the face of a
population not only unused to the sea, but also scanty in numbers.
Those who recall how the blockade was maintained, and the class of
ships that blockaded during great part of the war, know that the plan,
correct under the circumstances, could not have been carried out in
the face of a real navy. Scattered unsupported along the coast, the
United States ships kept their places, singly or in small detachments,
in face of an extensive network of inland water communications which
favored secret concentration of the enemy. Behind the first line of
water communications were long estuaries, and here and there strong
fortresses, upon either of which the enemy's ships could always fall
back to elude pursuit or to receive protection. Had there been a
Southern navy to profit by such advantages, or by the scattered
condition of the United States ships, the latter could not have been
distributed as they were; and being forced to concentrate for mutual
support, many small but useful approaches would have been left open to
commerce. But as the Southern coast, from its extent and many inlets,
might have been a source of strength, so, from those very
characteristics, it became a fruitful source of injury. The great
story of the opening of the Mississippi is but the most striking
illustration of an action that was going on incessantly all over the
South, At every breach of the sea frontier, war-ships were entering.