the French Revolution, the population of France was much greater than
that of England; but in respect of sea power in general, peaceful
commerce as well as military efficiency, France was much inferior to
England. In the matter of military efficiency this fact is the more
remarkable because at times, in point of military preparation at the
outbreak of war, France had the advantage; but she was not able to
keep it. Thus in 1778, when war broke out, France, through her
maritime inscription, was able to man at once fifty ships-of-the-line.
England, on the contrary, by reason of the dispersal over the globe of
that very shipping on which her naval strength so securely rested, had
much trouble in manning forty at home; but in 1782 she had one hundred
and twenty in commission or ready for commission, while France had
never been able to exceed seventy-one. Again, as late as 1840, when
the two nations were on the verge of war in the Levant, a most
accomplished French officer of the day, while extolling the high state
of efficiency of the French fleet and the eminent qualities of its
admiral, and expressing confidence in the results of an encounter with
an equal enemy, goes on to say: "Behind the squadron of twenty-one
ships-of-the-line which we could then assemble, there was no reserve;
not another ship could have been commissioned within six months." And
this was due not only to lack of ships and of proper equipments,
though both were wanting. "Our maritime inscription," he continues,
"was so exhausted by what we had done [in manning twenty-one ships],
that the permanent levy established in all quarters did not supply
reliefs for the men, who were already more than three years on
cruise."

A contrast such as this shows a difference in what is called staying
power, or reserve force, which is even greater than appears on the
surface; for a great shipping afloat necessarily employs, besides the