which makes it less applicable in considering what may result from a
single victory.

England is at the present time the greatest maritime nation in the
world; in steam and iron she has kept the superiority she had in the
days of sail and wood. France and England are the two powers that have
the largest military navies and it is so far an open question which of
the two is the more powerful, that they may be regarded as practically
of equal strength in material for a sea war. In the case of a
collision can there be assumed such a difference of _personnel_, or of
preparation, as to make it probable that a decisive inequality will
result from one battle or one campaign? If not, the reserve strength
will begin to tell; organized reserve first, then reserve of seafaring
population, reserve of mechanical skill, reserve of wealth. It seems
to have been somewhat forgotten that England's leadership in
mechanical arts gives her a reserve of mechanics, who can easily
familiarize themselves with the appliances of modern iron-clads; and
as her commerce and industries feel the burden of the war, the surplus
of seamen and mechanics will go to the armed shipping.

The whole question of the value of a reserve, developed or
undeveloped, amounts now to this: have modern conditions of warfare
made it probable that, of two nearly equal adversaries, one will be so
prostrated in a single campaign that a decisive result will be reached
in that time? Sea warfare has given no answer. The crushing successes
of Prussia against Austria, and of Germany against France, appear to
have been those of a stronger over a much weaker nation, whether the
weakness were due to natural causes, or to official incompetency. How
would a delay like that of Plevna have affected the fortune of war,
had Turkey had any reserve of national power upon which to call?