himself a seaman, and had commanded in two great sea-fights. When
William III. came to the throne, the governments of England and
Holland were under one hand, and continued united in one purpose
against Louis XIV. until the Peace of Utrecht in 1713; that is, for a
quarter of a century. The English government more and more steadily,
and with conscious purpose, pushed on the extension of her sea
dominion and fostered the growth of her sea power. While as an open
enemy she struck at France upon the sea, so as an artful friend, many
at least believed, she sapped the power of Holland afloat. The treaty
between the two countries provided that of the sea forces Holland
should furnish three eighths, England five eighths, or nearly double.
Such a provision, coupled with a further one which made Holland keep
up an army of 102,000 against England's 40,000, virtually threw the
land war on one and the sea war on the other. The tendency, whether
designed or not, is evident and at the peace, while Holland received
compensation by land, England obtained, besides commercial privileges
in France, Spain, and the Spanish West Indies, the important maritime
concessions of Gibraltar and Port Mahon in the Mediterranean; of
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Hudson's Bay in North America. The
naval power of France and Spain had disappeared; that of Holland
thenceforth steadily declined. Posted thus in America, the West
Indies, and the Mediterranean, the English government thenceforth
moved firmly forward on the path which made of the English kingdom the
British Empire. For the twenty-five years following the Peace of
Utrecht, peace was the chief aim of the ministers who directed the
policy of the two great seaboard nations, France and England; but amid
all the fluctuations of continental politics in a most unsettled
period, abounding in petty wars and shifty treaties, the eye of
England was steadily fixed on the maintenance of her sea power. In the
Baltic, her fleets checked the attempts of Peter the Great upon