The military chances in these wars are varied. The Russian army in the
Seven Years' War was in fact auxiliary to that of Austria and France:
still, it was a principal party in the North until its occupation of
Prussia. But when Generals Fermor and Soltikoff conducted the army as
far as Brandenburg it acted solely in the interest of Austria: the fate
of these troops, far from their base, depended upon the good or bad
maneuvering of their allies.

Such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate
operations. The campaigns of 1799 and 1805 furnish sad illustrations of
this, to which we shall again refer in Article XXIX., in discussing the
military character of these expeditions.

It follows, then, that the safety of the army may be endangered by these
distant interventions. The counterbalancing advantage is that its own
territory cannot then be easily invaded, since the scene of hostilities
is so distant; so that what may be a misfortune for the general may be,
in a measure, an advantage to the state.

In wars of this character the essentials are to secure a general who is
both a statesman and a soldier; to have clear stipulations with the
allies as to the part to be taken by each in the principal operations;
finally, to agree upon an objective point which shall be in harmony with
the common interests. By the neglect of these precautions, the greater
number of coalitions have failed, or have maintained a difficult
struggle with a power more united but weaker than the allies.

The third kind of intervention, which consists in interfering with the
whole force of the state and near to its frontiers, is more promising
than the others. Austria had an opportunity of this character in 1807,