disasters, what might have been avoided by prudence.

A war of invasion without good reason--like that of Genghis Khan--is a
crime against humanity; but it may be excused, if not approved, when
induced by great interests or when conducted with good motives.

The invasions of Spain of 1808 and of 1823 differed equally in object
and in results: the first was a cunning and wanton attack, which
threatened the existence of the Spanish nation, and was fatal to its
author; the second, while combating dangerous principles, fostered the
general interests of the country, and was the more readily brought to a
successful termination because its object met with the approval of the
majority of the people whose territory was invaded.

These illustrations show that invasions are not necessarily all of the
same character. The first contributed largely to the fall of Napoleon;
the second restored the relation between France and Spain, which ought
never to have been changed.

Let us hope that invasions may be rare. Still, it is better to attack
than to be invaded; and let us remember that the surest way to check the
spirit of conquest and usurpation is to oppose it by intervention at the
proper time.

An invasion, to be successful, must, be proportioned in magnitude to the
end to be attained and to the obstacles to be overcome.

An invasion against an exasperated people, ready for all sacrifices and
likely to be aided by a powerful neighbor, is a dangerous enterprise, as
was well proved by the war in Spain, (1808,) and by the wars of the