conversation could not have been expected to put the passions in motion,
or to have excited either hope or fear, or zeal or malignity, sufficient
to induce any man to put his reputation in hazard, however little he
might value it, or to overpower the love of truth, however weak might be
its influence.

36. The casuists have very diligently distinguished lies into their
several classes, according to their various degrees of malignity; but
they have, I think, generally omitted that which is most common, and,
perhaps, not less mischievous; which, since the moralists have not given
it a name, I shall distinguish as the lie of vanity.

To vanity may justly be imputed most of the falsehoods which every man
perceives hourly playing upon his ear, and perhaps most of those that
are propagated with success.

37. To the lie of commerce, and the lie of malice, the motive is so
apparent, that they are seldom negligently or implicitly received:
suspicion is always watchful over the practices of interest; and
whatever the hope of gain, or desire of mischief, can prompt one man to
assert, another is, by reasons equally cogent, incited to refute. But
vanity pleases herself with such slight gratifications, and looks
forward to pleasure so remotely consequential, that her practices raise
no alarm, and her stratagems are not easily discovered.

38. Vanity is, indeed, often suffered to pass unpursued by suspicion;
because he that would watch her motions, can never be at rest; fraud and
malice are bounded in their influence; some opportunity of time and
place is necessary to their agency; but scarce any man is abstracted one
moment from his vanity; and he, to whom truth affords no gratifications,