particular in our account of the corvus, because it may fairly be regarded
as having essentially contributed to the establishment of the Roman naval
power over that of the Carthaginians.

After Duilius had made a trial of the efficacy of this machine, he sailed
in quest of the enemy. The Carthaginians, despising the Romans as totally
inexperienced in naval affairs, did not even take the trouble or precaution
to draw up their ships in line of battle, but trusting entirely to their
own superior skill, and to the greater lightness of their ships, they bore
down on the Romans in disorder. They, however, were induced, for a short
time, to slacken their advance at the sight of the corvi; but not giving
the Romans credit for any invention which could counterbalance their want
of skill, experience, and self-confidence, they again pushed forward and
attacked the Romans. They soon suffered, however, the consequences of their
rashness: the Romans, by means of their corvi, grappled their ships so
closely and steadily, that the fight resembled much more a land than a sea
battle; and thus feeling themselves, as it were, on their own element,
while their enemies seemed to themselves no longer to be fighting in ships,
the confidence of the former rose, while that of the latter fell, from the
same cause, and nearly in the same proportion. The result was, that the
Romans gained a complete victory. The loss of the Carthaginians is
variously related by the Roman writers: this is extraordinary, since they
must have had access to the best possible authority; the inscription of the
Columna Rostrata of Duilius, which is still preserved at Rome. According to
this inscription, Duilius fitted out a fleet in sixty days, defeated the
Carthaginians, commanded by Hannibal, at sea, took from them thirty ships,
with all their rigging, and the septireme which carried the admiral
himself; sunk thirty, and took several prisoners of distinction. When
Hannibal saw the Romans about to enter his septireme, he leaped into a
small boat and escaped.