perceived the probable result of the battle, he fled precipitately with
thirty vessels. The Carthaginians did not lose a single ship or man on this
occasion. This was the most signal and disastrous defeat which the Romans
had suffered at sea since the commencement of the war. According to
Polybius, Claudius was tried, condemned, and very severely punished.

The other consul, Lucius Pullus, was not more successful, though his want
of success did not, as in the case of Claudius, arise from ignorance and
obstinacy. He was ordered to sail from Syracuse with a fleet of 120
galleys, and 800 transports, the latter laden with provisions and stores
for the army before Lilibaeum. As the army was much pressed for
necessaries, and the consul himself was not ready to put to sea directly,
he sent the quaestors before him with a small squadron. The Carthaginians,
who were very watchful, and had the best intelligence of all the Romans
were doing, having learnt that the consul was at sea with a large fleet,
sent 100 galleys to cruize off Heraclea. As soon as the squadron under the
quaestors came in sight, the Carthaginian admiral, though he mistook it for
the consular fleet, yet resolved to engage it: but the quaestors, having
received orders not to hazard a battle if they could possibly avoid, took
refuge behind some rocks, where they were attacked by the enemy. The Romans
defended themselves so well with balistae and other engines, which they had
erected on the rocks, that the Carthaginian admiral, after having captured
a few transports, was obliged to draw off his fleet.

In the mean time, the light vessels, employed on the lookout, informed him
that the whole consular fleet were directing their course for Lilibaeum:
his obvious plan was to engage this fleet before it could join that of the
quæstors; he therefore steered his course to meet them. But the consul was
equally averse with the quaestors to hazard the supply of the army by a
battle, and he, therefore, also took shelter near some rocks. The