contemplation as to neglect the good of his neighbour, nor be so deeply
immersed in action as to neglect the contemplation of God. In leisure we
ought to delight, not in an empty inertia, but in the inquisition or
discovery of truth, in such a way that each may make progress without
envying the attainments of another. In action we ought to seek neither
the honours of this life nor power, since all that is under the sun is
vanity; but only the work itself, which our situation enables us to do,
and to do it rightly and serviceably.

According to the definitions which Scipio used in Cicero's "Republic,"
there never really existed a Roman republic. For he briefly defines a
republic as the estate of the people--"res publica" as "res populi," and
defines the people as a multitudinous assemblage, united by consent to
law and by community of advantage. So, then, where justice is not, there
can be no people; and if no people, then no estate of the people, but
only of a confused multitude unworthy of the name of a people. Where no
justice is, there is no commonwealth. Now, justice is a virtue
distributing unto everyone his due. Where, then, is the justice of the
man who deserts the true God and gives himself over to unclean demons?
Is this giving everyone his due?

But if we define a people in another way, and consider it as an
assemblage of rational beings united by unanimity as to the objects of
their love, then, in order to ascertain the character of a people, we
must ascertain what things they love. Whatever it loves, so long as it
is an assemblage of rational creatures and not a herd of cattle, and is
agreed as to the objects of its love, it is truly a people, though so
much the better as its concord lies in better things, and so much the
worse as its concord lies in inferior things. According to this
definition, then, the Roman people is indeed a people, and its estate is