day would be greatly preferable. In the first place, because it would
give an opportunity for the display of his lordship's tactics, and
afford the means of taking prompt advantage of any mistake of the
enemy, change of the wind, or any other favourable circumstance; while
in the mêlée of a battle at night, there must always be greater risk
of separation, and of ships receiving the fire of their friends as
well as their foes." It is obvious to every comprehension, that a
night action must preclude all manoeuvring, and prevent the greater
skill of the tactician from having any advantage over the blunderer
who turns his ships into mere batteries. The only officer who
coincided with Jervis was Admiral Barrington, who gave as an
additional and a just argument for the attack by day, that it would
give an opportunity of ascertaining the conduct of the respective
captains in action. On those opinions Lord Howe made no comment; but
it is presumed that he ultimately agreed with them, from his conduct
in the celebrated action of the 1st of June 1794, when he had the
enemy's fleet directly to leeward of him from the night before.

In the relief of Gibraltar, the Foudroyant had the honour to be the
ship which was dispatched from the fleet to escort the victuallers
into the harbour, which was accomplished amid the acclamations of the
garrison. It had been expected that Lord Howe would have attacked the
combined fleets, and the nation of course looked forward to a victory;
but they were disappointed. The fact is, that Lord Howe, though a
brave man, and what is generally regarded as a good officer, was of a
different class of mind from the Jervises and Nelsons. He did his
duty, but he did no more. The men who were yet to give a character to
the navy did more than their duty, suffered no opportunity of
distinction to escape them, relied on the invincibility of British
prowess when it was boldly directed, and by that reliance rendered it