battalions. With a couple of millions less men, the Kaiser might have
taken more care of them and made a better job of it.

At the same time I hold no brief for small States as such, and most
vehemently deny that we are in any way bound to knight errantry on their
behalf as against big ones. They are mostly either incorrigibly
bellicose themselves, like Montenegro, or standing temptations to the
big Powers, like Bosnia and Herzegovina. They multiply frontiers, which
are nuisances, and languages, which have made confusion since the
building of Babel. The striking contrast between the United States of
North America and the disunited States of South America in this respect
is, from the Pacifist point of view, very much in favor of the northern
unity. The only objection to large political units is that they make
extremely dangerous autocracies. But as groups of federated democracies
they are the best neighbours in the world. A federal democratic Russia
would be as safe a colleague as America: a federal democratic Germany
would be as pleasant company as Switzerland. Let us, I beg, hear no more
of little States as British Dulcineas.


*The Claims of Belgium.*

As to the special case of Belgium, its claims in the settlement are
simple and indeed single. If we conclude a peace without clearing the
Germans completely out of Belgium, we shall be either beaten or
dishonoured. And such indemnity as a money payment can effect for
Belgium is due not only by Germany, but by Britain, France, and Russia
as well. Belgium has been crushed between the Alliance and the Entente:
it was these two menaces to the peace of Europe that produced
Armageddon; and as Belgium's heroic resistance served the Entente