greatly disappointed himself and the British public) by simply
frightening the Kaiser. As it was, he had arranged for the co-operation
of the French and British fleets; was spoiling for the fight; and must
have restrained himself with great difficulty from taking off his coat
in public whilst Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey were giving the country
the assurances which were misunderstood to mean that we were not bound
to go to war, and not more likely to do so than usual. But though Sir
Edward did not clear up the misunderstanding, I think he went to war
with the heavy heart of a Junker Liberal (such centaurs exist) and not
with the exultation of a Junker Jingo.

I may now, without more than the irreducible minimum of injustice to Sir
Edward Grey, proceed to tell the story of the diplomatic negotiations as
they will appear to the Congress which, I am assuming, will settle the
terms on which Europe is to live more or less happily ever after.

*Diplomatic History of the War.*

The evidence of how the Junker diplomatists of our Foreign Office let us
in for the war is in the White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914),
containing correspondence respecting the European crisis, and since
reissued, with a later White Paper and some extra matter, as a penny
bluebook in miniature. In these much-cited and little-read documents we
see the Junkers of all the nations, the men who have been saying for
years "It's bound to come," and clamouring in England for compulsory
military service and expeditionary forces, momentarily staggered and not
a little frightened by the sudden realization that it has come at last.
They rush round from foreign office to embassy, and from embassy to
palace, twittering "This is awful. Can't you stop it? Won't you be
reasonable? Think of the consequences," etc., etc. One man among them