genuine British effort to escape from national irritations. But before
the Treaty of 1842 was signed, even while it was in the earlier stages
of negotiation, the British Government saw, with alarm, quite new
questions arising, preventing, to its view, that harmonious relation
with the United States the desire for which had led to the Ashburton
mission. This new development was the appearance of an American fever
for territorial expansion, turning first toward Texas, but soon voiced
as a "manifest destiny" which should carry American power and
institutions to the Pacific and even into Central America. Among these
institutions was that of slavery, detested by the public of Great
Britain, yet a delicate matter for governmental consideration since the
great cotton manufacturing interests drew the bulk of their supplies of
raw cotton from the slave-holding states of America. If Texas, herself a
cotton state, should join the United States, dependence upon slave-grown
cotton would be intensified. Also, Texas, once acquired, what was there
to prevent further American exploitation, followed by slave expansion,
into Mexico, where for long British influence had been dominant?

On the fate of Texas, therefore, centred for a time the whole British
policy toward America. Pakenham, the British minister to Mexico, urged a
British pressure on Mexico to forgo her plans of reconquering Texas, and
strong British efforts to encourage Texas in maintaining her
independence. His theory foreshadowed a powerful buffer Anglo-Saxon
state, prohibiting American advance to the south-west, releasing Britain
from dependence on American cotton, and ultimately, he hoped, leading
Texas to abolish slavery, not yet so rooted as to be ineradicable. This
policy was approved by the British Government, Pakenham was sent to
Washington to watch events, a _chargé_, Elliot, was despatched to Texas,
and from London lines were cast to draw France into the plan and to
force the acquiescence of Mexico.