with France. Why not? The mighty elder power is eager to see America
realise her own world position, and come forward to take her share in
a world-ordering, which has lain too heavy until now on England's sole
shoulders. She is glad and thankful--the "weary Titan"--to hand over
some of her responsibilities to America, and to share many of the
rest. She wants nothing more for herself--the Great Mother of
Nations--why should she? She has so much. But loss of prestige? The
feeling in those with whom I have talked, is rather the feeling of
Kipling's _Recessional_--a profound and wondering recognition that the
Imperial bond has indeed stood so magnificently the test of these four
years, just as Joseph Chamberlain, the Empire-builder, believed and
hoped it would stand, when the day of testing came; a pride in what
the Empire has done too deep for many words; coupled with the stubborn
resolution, which says little and means everything--that the future
shall be worthy of the past.

And as to the feeling of the Army--it is expressed, and, as far as I
have been able to judge from much talk with those under his command,
most truly expressed, in Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig's December
despatch--which came out, as it happens, the very day I had the honour
of standing at his side in the Commander-in-Chief's room, at G.H.Q.,
and looking with him at the last maps of the final campaign. "The
effect of the great assaults," says the Field-Marshal, "in which,
during nine days of battle (September 26th--October 5th), the First,
Third, and Fourth Armies stormed the line of the Canal du Nord, and
broke through the Hindenburg line, upon the subsequent course of the
campaign, was decisive.... Great as were the material losses the enemy
had suffered, the effect of so overwhelming a defeat upon a _morale_
already deteriorated, was of even larger importance." Again: "By the
end of October, the rapid succession of heavy blows dealt by the