combined with the experienced and cool-headed leadership of the
British Commander-in-Chief, refused to dissipate the French reserves,
so important to the future course of the war, in any small or
piecemeal reinforcement of the British lines. The risks of the great
moment had to be taken, and both the French and British Commanders had
complete faith in the capacity of the British Army to meet them. And
when all is said, when our grave losses in casualties, prisoners, and
guns are fully admitted, what was the general result? The Germans had
failed to gain either of their real objectives:--either the Channel
ports, or the division of the British Armies from the French. They
wore themselves out against a line which recoiled indeed but never
broke, and was all the time filling up and strengthening from behind.
The losses inflicted on their immense reserves reacted on all the
subsequent fighting of the year, both on the Aisne and the Marne. And
when the British Armies had brought the huge attack to a
standstill--which for the centre and south of our line had been
already attained ten days after the storm broke--and knew the worst
that had happened or could happen to them; when the Australians had
recaptured Villers-Bretonneux; when the weeks passed and the offensive
ceased; when all gaps in our ranks were filled by the rush of
reinforcements from home, and the American Army poured steadily across
the Atlantic, the tension and peril of the spring passed steadily into
the confident strength and--expectation of the summer. The British
Army had held against an attack which could never be repeated, and the
future was with the Allies.

Let us remember that at no time in our fighting withdrawal, either on
the Somme or on the Lys, was there "anything approaching a break-down
of command, or a failure in morale." So the Field Marshal. On the
other hand, all over the vast battle-field--in every part of the hard