only so can it be kept fit to respond to any emergency. The officers and
men alike should be kept as much as possible on blue water, for it is
there only they can learn their duties as they should be learned. The
big vessels should be manoeuvred in squadrons containing not merely
battle ships, but the necessary proportion of cruisers and scouts. The
torpedo boats should be handled by the younger officers in such manner
as will best fit the latter to take responsibility and meet the
emergencies of actual warfare.

Every detail ashore which can be performed by a civilian should be
so performed, the officer being kept for his special duty in the
sea service. Above all, gunnery practice should be unceasing. It
is important to have our Navy of adequate size, but it is even more
important that ship for ship it should equal in efficiency any navy in
the world. This is possible only with highly drilled crews and officers,
and this in turn imperatively demands continuous and progressive
instruction in target practice, ship handling, squadron tactics, and
general discipline. Our ships must be assembled in squadrons actively
cruising away from harbors and never long at anchor. The resulting wear
upon engines and hulls must be endured; a battle ship worn out in long
training of officers and men is well paid for by the results, while, on
the other hand, no matter in how excellent condition, it is useless if
the crew be not expert.

We now have seventeen battle ships appropriated for, of which nine are
completed and have been commissioned for actual service. The remaining
eight will be ready in from two to four years, but it will take at least
that time to recruit and train the men to fight them. It is of vast
concern that we have trained crews ready for the vessels by the time
they are commissioned. Good ships and good guns are simply good weapons,